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Abstract: This paper extends the previous literature on the ethical links between the 
measurement of poverty, social welfare and inequality. We show inter alia, how, 
when the range of possible poverty lines is unbounded above, a robust ranking of 
absolute poverty may be interpreted as a robust ranking of social welfare, and a 
robust ranking of relative poverty may be interpreted as a robust ranking of 
inequality, and this, for any order of stochastic dominance. 
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Queried in 1989 about a report of the European Commission on poverty in
the U.K., Margaret Thatcher replied that “poverty no longer exists in Britain,
only inequality”, and that the authors of the study were confusing inequality
and poverty. Referring to the measurement of poverty when the poverty line
is set as a function of the income distribution, Gary Fields (1980) writes
that “this is more an inequality measure than a poverty measure, because if
everyone’s income were to increase by the same percentage, poverty would
be unaﬀected”1. Commenting on the links between poverty and (relative)
inequality, Sen (1983) argues that poverty is an absolute notion in the space
of capabilities2 but that it often takes a relative form in the space of income
or consumption because the achievement of some social functionings requires
more income in a richer society. Saunders (1994, p.227) further contends
that
it does not seem possible to develop an approach to poverty mea-
surement which is linked to absolute standards. While some
analysts are uneasy with relativist concepts of poverty on the
grounds that they are diﬃcult to comprehend and can be seen as
somewhat arbitrary and open to manipulation, no real practical
alternative to relativist concepts exists.
This important debate raises the basic issue of whether general links can
be formally established between the measurement of poverty, inequality and
social welfare. As reported by Atkinson (1998), the theoretical literature is
not of full help in answering this question since most of the existing papers
1These quotations are drawn from Atkinson (1998).
2Capabilities are deﬁned by Sen as the set of functionings available to an individual.
1have been written either on poverty or on inequality, but rarely on both top-
ics simultaneously (a notable exception being Foster and Shorrocks (1988c).
Moreover, empirical analysts concerned with poverty and inequality have of-
ten relied on some particular indices to order distributions. As pointed out
by Blackorby and Donaldson (1978), there is a particular social value judge-
ment that underlies every particular choice of index, and it would appear
hazardous to make distributive comparisons dependent on such particular
value judgements.
This last issue has, however, fortunately led to a signiﬁcant development
of methodologies to establish the ethical robustness of distributive compar-
isons. The general idea is to verify whether an ordering of distributions can
be deemed to remain the same under wide spectra of indices. In practice,
this is done using “stochastic dominance curves”, some of them having ﬁrst
been introduced in the ﬁnancial literature to rank distributions of portfo-
lios returns. Pioneering work on this topic addressed the measurement of
inequality (Kolm (1969), Atkinson (1970), and Dasgupta, Sen and Starrett
(1973)). The idea was inter alia extended to the measurement of social wel-
fare by Shorrocks (1983) and to that of poverty by Atkinson (1987), Foster
and Shorrocks (1988a, b), and Jenkins and Lambert (1997, 1998a, b).
There exist many orders of stochastic dominance. Each order can be
given an ethical interpretation when used in the context of welfare analysis.
When two stochastic dominance curves of a given order do not intersect, all
indices that obey the ethical principles associated to this order of dominance
then rank identically the two distributions. Indices of absolute poverty and
welfare that obey the ﬁrst-order principles must be such that poverty weakly
decreases and that welfare weakly increases when an individual’s income
increases. These indices are thus of the Pareto type in addition to being
2symmetric in income (they obey the anonymity axiom). For indices of relative
poverty, analogous properties also apply if mean income is held artiﬁcially
exogenous to that change. 3
Second-order indices must respect the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers.
This principle postulates that a mean-preserving transfer of income from a
higher-income person to a lower-income person constitutes a social improve-
ment. 4 Third-order indices must also be sensitive to favorable composite
transfers. These transfers are such that a beneﬁcial Pigou-Dalton transfer
within the lower part of the distribution, coupled with a reverse Pigou-Dalton
transfer within the upper part of the distribution, will add to welfare and
decrease poverty and inequality, provided that the variance of the distribu-
tion is not increased. 5. Higher-order indices can be interpreted using the
generalized transfer principles of Fishburn and Willig (1984). Fourth-order
indices, for instance, use a combination of composite transfers, a favorable
one occurring within a lower part of the distribution, and an unfavorable
one occurring within a higher part of the distribution. Fourth-order indices
3Note that ﬁrst-order classes of inequality indices are generally not considered in the
literature, since unrestricted dominance rankings of distributions over such classes are not
possible (these issues are discussed in some depth in Duclos and Makdissi (2001)).
4The Pigou-Dalton criterion has been framed alternatively as a strong and as a weak
axiom for the study of poverty indices (see Donaldson and Weymark (1986) and Zheng
(1999)). In the weak version, the axiom says that the poverty index must increase following
a transfer from one individual to another, wealthier, individual, providing that both are
initially below the poverty line and the transfer does not lift the wealthier person above
this threshold. The strong axiom postulates that the index must increase even if this
transfer pushes the higher-income recipient above the poverty line.
5Kolm (1976) was the ﬁrst to introduce this condition into the inequality literature, and
Kakwani (1980) subsequently adapted it to poverty measurement (see also Davies and Hoy
(1994) and Shorrocks and Foster (1987) for a complete characterization of this transfer
principle). As with the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers, it can also be formulated as a
strong or as a weak axiom. There are, in fact, three diﬀerent formulations of the composite
transfer. The interested reader may refer to Zheng (1997) for an informative discussion of
this.
3respond favorably to this combination of composite transfers. 6
Given all this, therefore, how can the measurement of social welfare,
inequality and poverty be formally linked? Ravallion (1994) hints that, “in
the limit, as the poverty line approaches the highest level of living”, certain
classes of poverty measures will automatically rank distributions identically
to certain classes of welfare measures. Foster and Shorrocks (1988a, b, and c)
have indeed established that poverty orderings over wide ranges of poverty
lines of some of the FGT (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984)) poverty
indices are equivalent to stochastic dominance orderings of social welfare or
inequality for some low orders of dominance. The main objective of this
paper is to clarify and to extend these lines of arguments.
To achieve this, the paper ﬁrst generalizes Foster and Shorrocks’ ﬁrst-,
second-, and third-order equivalencies to a broader class of indices. This is
fairly straightforward given the link between indices of the FGT class and
the functions used to test for poverty dominance of various orders.
The paper then establishes the conditions under which these equivalencies
may hold for any higher-order dominance. A ﬁrst result is that assumptions
of various degrees of continuity of poverty indices at the poverty line make
poverty rankings generally easier to obtain than welfare or inequality rankings
since these assumptions avoid the need to check dominance criteria at lower
orders of dominance. Robust rankings are also naturally easier to obtain for
poverty than welfare and inequality when the maximum poverty line is set
below the maximal income.
6Generalized higher-order transfer principles essentially postulate that, as the order
increases, the ethical weight assigned to the eﬀect of transfers occurring at the bottom of
the distribution also increases. Blackorby and Donaldson (1978) describe these indices as
becoming more Rawlsian.
4A popular empirical choice for the upper bound of social welfare com-
parisons is indeed the maximal income level found in a sample. The paper
nevertheless shows that extending from the top income to inﬁnity the up-
per income bound for dominance testing increases the ranking power of social
welfare and inequality dominance criteria. This procedure also has the virtue
of removing the empirical arbitrariness (and associated sampling variability)
of choosing the upper bound of welfare and inequality dominance test ranges.
When the maximum poverty line is set equal to the upper income bound,
absolute poverty and welfare dominance criteria become equivalent only for
ﬁrst- and second-order dominance. When the maximum relative poverty line
extends to the upper income bound, relative poverty and inequality dom-
inance criteria become equivalent only for the second and third orders of
dominance. If the maximum poverty line is left to extend toward inﬁnity,
these criteria become equivalent for all orders of stochastic dominance. It
is only then, therefore, that poverty and welfare/inequality orderings can be
reconciled at any order of stochastic dominance. As mentioned above, such
an extension has the further advantage of increasing the ranking power of
social welfare and inequality dominance criteria. Finally, when the order of
dominance tends toward inﬁnity, only the lowest income counts for poverty
rankings (as shown in Davidson and Duclos (2000)), though this paper also
shows that this result does not generalize to welfare and inequality domi-
nance.
The next section 2 deﬁnes classes of poverty, inequality, and social welfare
indices and uses these classes to develop various criteria for stochastic domi-
nance. Section 3 then establishes formal links between poverty comparisons,
on the one hand, and comparisons of social welfare and inequality, on the
other.
52 Classes of Poverty, Welfare, and Inequality
indices
We wish to compare two distributions of well-being y (income, for short),
each of which is represented by a distribution function drawn from the set
=:
= := fF : [0;a] ! [0;1]jF is nondecreasing, continuous and ontog;
where F is an income distribution function and a is some value equal to
(or exceeding) the maximum possible income. We consider four types of
comparisons for these distributions: comparisons of absolute poverty, relative
poverty, social welfare, and relative inequality. To compare absolute poverty,
the analyst must ﬁrst choose a poverty line, z; such that individuals earning
less than this amount are identiﬁed as poor. Subsequently, a poverty index,
P A; must be selected to aggregate the diﬀerent individuals’ contributions to






pA (y;z)dF (y); (1)
where:
pA (y;z) ¸ 0; if y · z;
pA (y;z) = 0; if y > z:
¾
(2)
The function pA (y;z) represents the contribution to total poverty made
by an individual with income y: We regroup these additive indices into classes
Πs






AjpA (y;z) 2 b C
s and (¡1)
i @pA (y;z)




6where b Cs represents the set of functions that are s times piecewise diﬀeren-
tiable on [0;1) 7:
Consider now two income distribution functions, F and G; both drawn
from the set =: In order to simplify the exposition, we deﬁne stochastic
dominance curves D1





F (u)du for all integers
s ¸ 2: Ds
G (y) is deﬁned similarly. Consider, ﬁrst, comparisons of absolute
poverty. When poverty does not increase in a movement from distribution









pA (y;z)dF (y) · 0: (4)
If there is a consensus that the poverty line z should not exceed some maxi-
mum, denoted by z+; then it is possible to lay out a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for absolute poverty dominance applicable to all orders of stochas-
tic dominance (for ease of exposition, the proofs of all propositions appear
in the appendix).
Proposition 1 A necessary and suﬃcient condition for ∆P A
FG (z) · 0; for




F (y) ¡ D
s
G (y) ¸ 0 8y · z
+: (DSPA)
7Notice that if the (s ¡ 1)-th derivative of a function is piecewise diﬀerentiable, the
(s ¡ 1)
th derivative is necessarily continuous and the function itself and its ﬁrst (s ¡ 2)
derivatives are continuous and diﬀerentiable everywhere. Admitting functions of which
the (s ¡ 1)-th derivative is piecewise diﬀerentiable allows us to include into Πs
A the FGT
class of measures (for ® = s), which is the most widely used class of poverty indices in the
literature. Note also that the continuity condition we impose is more restrictive than that
in Zheng (1999), which only postulates continuity on the interval [0;z): This diﬀerence
between his and our assumptions has implications for the analysis developed in this paper.
Speciﬁcally, we are able to consider dominance criteria for orders greater than two, even
when there is signiﬁcant uncertainty on the value of the lower bounds for the ranges of
possible poverty lines. We shall return to this later in the paper.
7Note that poverty dominance of order three and higher does not collapse
to second order dominance as is the case in Zheng (1999).
To compare relative poverty, the analyst must ﬁrst select a function,
» (F); that sets the poverty line as a function of the income distribution
F: In this paper we ﬁx this threshold as a proportion of the mean of the
distribution8. Thus, we have:
» (F) = ¸¹F; (5)
where ¹F is the mean of the distribution F and ¸ 2 [0;1): We might at ﬁrst
presume that the analyst is only interested in ¸ 2 [0;a=¹F]; but considering
the range of all positive reals will prove useful for the subsequent analysis.
In order to aggregate the various incomes’ contribution to relative poverty,






pR (y;¸¹F)dF (y); (6)
where
pR (y;¸¹F) ¸ 0; if y · ¸¹F;




pR (y;¸¹F) is homogeneous of degree zero in y and ¹F: (8)
The function pR (y;¸¹F) measures the contribution an individual with in-
come y makes to total poverty when the income distribution function is F:
We use the classes of relative poverty indices Πs






RjpR (y;¸¹F) 2 b C
s and (¡1)
i @ipR (y;¸¹F)




8This is often done in the empirical literature. For example, the EUROMOD simulation
package uses this deﬁnition for the poverty line for poverty comparisons across countries
of the European Union (cf. Immervoll, O’Donoghue and Sutherland (1999)).
8If there is no increase in poverty subsequent to a passage from distribution









pR (y;¸¹F)dF (y) · 0: (10)
Consider relative poverty lines up to some maximum proportion of the mean,
¸
+: To establish relative poverty dominance criteria, we ﬁrst deﬁne transfor-
mations of the distribution functions F and G, b F and b G; obtained by dividing
each income in the original distribution by the average income in that distri-
bution. The transformed incomes are thus b yF = y=¹F for b F and b yG = y=¹G
for b G: This yields
D
s+1









This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2 A necessary and suﬃcient condition for ∆P R
FG (¸) · 0; for








b F (¸) ¡ D
s
b G (¸) ¸ 0 8¸ · ¸
+: (DSPR)
Turning now to social welfare, we consider utilitarian social welfare func-










Uju(y) 2 b C
s and (¡1)
i diu(y)
dyi · 0 8i = 1;2;:::;s
¾
: (12)
9We can assert that there is no decline in welfare in moving from distribu-







u(y)dF (y) ¸ 0: (13)
This leads to the next proposition.
Proposition 3 A suﬃcient condition for ∆UFG ¸ 0; for all U 2 Ωs; is:
Ds
F (y) ¡ Ds
G (y) ¸ 0 8y 2 [0;a]:
and, if s ¸ 3;
Di
F (a) ¡ Di
G (a) ¸ 0 8i 2 f2;:::;s ¡ 1g:
(DSU)
Notice that, for s = 1 and 2; the dominance conditions for comparisons of
absolute poverty and for welfare comparisons are identical if we let z+ = a: If
we considered only those functions u(y) for which u0 (y) = 0 when y ¸ a; then
this similarity would automatically be extended to all orders of stochastic
dominance. This would require that the utility “bliss” point be achieved at
the maximum income a, and that further increases in incomes passed a would
be socially worthless.
As Blackorby and Donaldson (1978) demonstrate, each of the social wel-
fare functions depicted in (11) can be associated with a traditional Atkinson-
Kolm-Sen index of inequality of the form:
I
U




where the equally-distributed-equivalent income ye is implicitly deﬁned as:




These indices are relative inequality indices9 if and only if the function u(y)
is isoelastic. Given the subset of Ωs for which u(y) is isoelastic, it is possible
9An inequality index is relative if IF = IG whenever F (y) = G(¸y) for all y and for
any given ¸ > 0:





U j U 2 Ω
s and u is isoelastic
ª
: (16)
For inequality comparisons, we can establish that there is no increase in







F · 0: (17)
Using the transformed distributions b F and b G; we can deﬁne analogous criteria
for stochastic dominance in inequality comparisons.
Proposition 4 ∆IFG · 0 for all I 2 Υs; s ¸ 2; if:
Ds
b F (°) ¡ Ds
b G (°) ¸ 0 8° 2 [0;®];
and, if s ¸ 4;
Ds
b F (®) ¡ Ds
b F (®) ¸ 0 8i 2 f3;:::;s ¡ 1g;
(DSI)







Note that we have excluded s = 1 in Proposition 4. As alluded to before,
this is because ﬁrst-order (unrestricted) inequality dominance is not possible.
3 Welfare, Inequality, and Poverty Dominance
We now wish to use the dominance criteria DSPA, DSPR, DSU and DSI to
establish equivalencies between comparisons of poverty and comparisons of
welfare or inequality.
A ﬁrst diﬀerence between poverty dominance criteria and welfare (and
inequality) dominance criteria is that it is likely that z+ 6= a (and ¸
+ 6=
®), which renders the domain of the tests for poverty dominance narrower
or wider than that for social welfare or inequality dominance. A second
11diﬀerence is that welfare and inequality dominance criteria are generally more
demanding10, since we need to test a series of conditions at a or ® at orders
less than s: Hence, welfare orderings cannot be seen as particular cases of
absolute poverty orderings, and inequality orderings are not relative poverty
orderings, at least when the upper bound for the range of potential poverty
lines is ﬁnite. Furthermore, poverty dominance of order three or higher
up to a maximum ﬁnite level for the poverty line does not necessarily imply
welfare or inequality dominance of the same order. These ordering diﬀerences
arise from the implicit assumption made that the ﬁrst s ¡ 1 derivatives of
the poverty indices to vanish at the poverty line, because of the deﬁnition
of poverty indices (in particular, p(y;z) = 0 when y > z) and of the b Cs
continuity assumption. It is natural not to impose such a nullity condition
for social welfare indices, which explains the presence of conditions at a or ®
at orders less than s.
Nonetheless, if we perform both the poverty and the social welfare/inequa-
lity dominance tests on the unrestricted domain [0;1) rather than on [0;z+]
or [0;a], we can establish certain equivalencies between comparisons of abso-
lute poverty and welfare, on the one hand, and comparisons between relative
poverty and inequality, on the other. For this, we draw on the work of Fish-
burn (1980), who establishes a link between stochastic dominance criteria of
various orders and the moments of distribution functions when these func-
tions are such that a ! 1: We generalize these results to all distribution
functions belonging to = and then adapt them to our analysis. Unlike Fish-
burn (1980), we also establish a link between s-order dominance conditions
and dominance at a or ® at lower orders.
10This, however, would not be true if we worked in Zheng’s (1999) framework in which
poverty dominance of order higher than 3 would be more demanding than welfare domi-
nance.
12To do this, we must ﬁrst deﬁne a binary relationship >¤
s on fDF (x) j F 2 =g;




Deﬁnition 1 DF (x) >¤
s DG (x) if and only if Di
F (x) ¡ Di
G (x) > 0 for the
smallest i · s such that Di
F (x) 6= Di
G (x).
Second, we must decompose Ds
F (x) to establish a link between the dif-
ferent orders of dominance conditions.







Using lemma 5, we can establish the following link between tests of s-
order stochastic dominance and lower-order tests:
Theorem 6 If F;G 2 =, then DF(a) >¤
s DG (a) if Ds
F (x)¡Ds
G (x) ¸ 0 8x 2
<+.
This establishes a link between s-order dominance conditions over <+
and dominance conditions at the limit a of the distribution at some lower
order. Note from Lemma 5, however, that when DF (a) >¤
s DG (a), it must
be that limx!1[Di
F(x) ¡ Di
G(x)] ¸ 0 for all i · s. We thus have:
Corollary 7 Given that F;G 2 =, if F 6= G and if Ds
F (y) ¡ Ds
G (y) ¸
0 8y 2 <+, then limx!1 [Di
F (x) ¡ Di
G (x)] ¸ 0 for all i · s:
Corollary 7 says that if the unrestricted dominance condition at order
s is met, then the lower-order conditions at x ! 1 are also met. Hence,
extending the domain of the s¡order test Ds
F(x) ¡ Ds
G(x) ¸ 0 over the
unrestricted positive real domain of x avoids checking conditions at orders
lower than s.
13We noted at the end of Section 2 that, when s ! 1; only the lowest
income mattered for poverty dominance over a range of poverty lines bounded
above by a ﬁnite maximum poverty line. This result no longer obtains,
however, if the range of possible poverty lines extends to inﬁnity. Indeed, the
result in corollary 7 indicates that, if we were to obtain unrestricted s¡order
dominance on <+; we would implicitly need weak dominance for all orders
i lower than s (i.e., Di
F(x) ¡ Di
G(x) ¸ 0;i = 1;:::;s ¡ 1) at the point x
tending to inﬁnity. All incomes would matter in fulﬁlling those lower orders
of dominance conditions, not only the lowest one.
The result of Corollary 7 leads to further links between absolute poverty
and welfare at every order of dominance11:
Proposition 8 ∆UFG ¸ 0 for all U 2 Ωs; if:
D
s
F (y) ¡ D
s
G (y) ¸ 0 8y 2 [0;1): (DSU’)
When testing for social welfare dominance, condition DSU’ has the advan-
tage of being a simpler and weaker condition than DSU. By Lemma 5, DSU
clearly implies DSU’. DSU’ does not, however, necessarily imply DSU. By
Theorem 6, all we can say is that if Ds
F(x)¡Ds
G(x) ¸ 0;8x 2 <+ (and thus if
DSU’ holds), then Di
F(a)¡Di
G(a) for the lowest i such that Di
F(x) 6= Di
G(x),
but not necessarily for the other higher values of i (as required by DSU).
Therefore, extending the test range for s¡order social welfare dominance in-
creases the ranking power of the procedure: there are distributions that can
be ordered using DSU’, but which will fail to be ordered using DSU. A result
similar to Proposition 8 obtains for inequality dominance:
11Fishburn’s (1980) theorem allows to draw such links only for the ﬁrst three orders of
dominance.
14Proposition 9 ∆IFG · 0 for all I 2 Υs, s ¸ 2, if:
D
s
b F (°) ¡ D
s
b G (°) ¸ 0 8° 2 [0;1): (DSI’)
Again, condition DSI’ is a weaker suﬃcient condition for inequality dom-
inance than condition DSI in Proposition 4. Using these results it is possible
to establish equivalencies between poverty comparisons and welfare and in-
equality comparisons.
Proposition 10 Given two distributions F and G 6= F, if ∆P A
FG (z) · 0 for
any index P A 2 Πs
A and any threshold z 2 [0;1); then ∆UFG ¸ 0 for any
index U 2 Ωs.
We should note here that Foster and Shorrocks (1988b) obtain similar
results for dominance orders s = 1;2 and 3 applied to the FGT class of
poverty indices. Using Fishburn’s theorem (1980), Foster and Shorrocks’




A: The additional contribution of Theorem 6 and Corollary 7
is to generalize such results to any order of stochastic dominance.
A similar result holds for relative poverty and inequality comparisons.
Proposition 11 Given two distributions F and G 6= F, if ∆P R
FG (¸) · 0
for any index P A 2 Πs
R and for any relative poverty threshold ¸ 2 [0;1);
then ∆IFG · 0 for any index I 2 Υs:
Again, note that Foster and Shorrocks (1988c) develop a similar result
for FGT indices and for s = 2 and 3: Theorem 6 and corollary 7 allow
us to expand the equivalence between comparisons of relative poverty and
comparisons of inequality to all orders of stochastic dominance and to the
larger classes Πs
R of relative poverty indices.
15The last two propositions establish a clear link between absolute poverty
and welfare comparisons, on the one hand, and comparisons of relative
poverty and inequality, on the other. When poverty lines can extend to
inﬁnity, Ravallion’s (1994) intuitive argument holds, and robust poverty com-
parisons for the Πs
A classes of indices are in fact robust welfare comparisons
for the Ωs classes of indices. Moreover, robust relative poverty comparisons
for the Πs
R classes of indices over an unrestricted range of relative poverty
lines are in fact robust comparisons of inequality for the Υs classes of indices.
Under these conditions, it thus becomes possible to treat a ranking of abso-
lute poverty indices as a ranking of welfare indices, and a ranking of relative
poverty indices as a ranking of inequality indices.
16Appendix
Proof of proposition 1. This proposition is in fact a generalization of
Atkinson’s (1987) results, which cover the cases of s = 1;2. Condition DSPA
is not entirely new, since a similar version is found in Foster and Shorrocks
(1988a). Their analysis, however, deals only with the FGT class of indices
for s = 1;2;3, and not, as we do, with the entire Πs
A classes of indices. In
order to prove proposition 1, we ﬁrst need to integrate equation (1) by parts:
Z a
0













We know that, by deﬁnition of the domain, D1
F (0) = 0: Furthermore, as-
sumption (2) postulates that pA (a;z) = 0 since z · a: The ﬁrst term on the
r.h.s. is thus nil. Consequently, we have:
Z a
0








Now, assume that, for some i 2 f2;:::;s ¡ 1g; we have:
Z a
0








Integrating by parts, we obtain:
Z a
0























We know that, by deﬁnition of the domain, Di
F (0) = 0: Furthermore, the
assumption in equation (2) postulates that pA (a;y) = 0 for all y ¸ z: Con-
sequently, we know that
@i¡1pA(a;z)
@yi¡1 = 0: Finally, since Di
F (a) 6= 1; the ﬁrst
term in the braces vanishes. Thus, we have:
Z a
0








17Equation (19) respects the relationship in (20). Since we have shown that
equation (20) implies equation (22), we know that this latter equation is
true for all i 2 f1;2;:::;s ¡ 1g: By assumption, the function
@s¡1pA(y;z)
@ys¡1 is
continuous and either diﬀerentiable or piecewise diﬀerentiable. If the function
@s¡1pA(y;z)
@ys¡1 has n points at which it is not diﬀerentiable, we denote these points
yk; k = 1;2;:::n. Integrating equation (22) by parts, for i = s ¡ 1; yields:
Z a
0





















We know that, by deﬁnition of the domain, Ds
F (0) = 0: Furthermore, as-
sumption (2) postulates that pA (a;y) = 0 for all y ¸ z: Consequently, we
know that
@s¡1pA(a;z)
@ys¡1 = 0: The ﬁrst term in the braces is thus nil. We have:
Z a
0


































G (y) ¡ D
s
F (y)]dy: (26)
To prove suﬃciency we only need to use equation (26) and the deﬁnition of
the set Πs
A. We can then conclude that, if we have Ds
F (y)¡Ds
G (y) ¸ 0; 8y ·
z+; we must have ∆P A
FG (z) · 0. In order to establish necessity, we use a







s¡1 ²; if y · y;
(¡1)
s¡1 (y + ² ¡ y); if y < y · y + ²;
0; if y ¸ y + ²;
; (27)
18where y < z. Poverty indices whose functions pA (y;z) have the above-given
form for
@s¡1pA(y;z)






0; if y · y;
(¡1)
s ; if y · y · y + ²;
0; if y ¸ y + ²:
(28)
Imagine now that Ds
F (y) ¡ Ds
G (y) < 0 on an interval [y;y + ²]; with y < z
and ² arbitrarily close to 0. For pA (y;z) deﬁned as in (27), ∆P A
FG (z) is
thus positive and poverty increases with a movement from distribution F
to distribution G: Hence it cannot be that Ds
F (y) ¡ Ds
G (y) < 0 for some
y 2 [y;y + ²] when y < z+. This proves the necessity of the condition.
Proof of proposition 2. This proposition is similar to the normalized
stochastic dominance condition presented in Formby, Smith and Zheng (1999)
and Zheng, Formby, Smith and Chow (2000) for inequality dominance, except
that condition DSPR considers proportions of the mean only up to ¸
+. In
order to prove the suﬃciency of the DSPR condition we use assumption A4.
Since the function pR (y;¸¹F) is homogeneous of degree zero in y and ¹F; we
know that pR (y;¸¹F) = pR (b yF;¸) and, by extension, P R
F = P R
b F . Similarly,
we conclude that P R
G = P R
b G. We know that ¹ b F = ¹ b G = 1 and that pR (b y;¸)
belongs to the class Πs when we ﬁx ¸ = z. Thus, we only need to apply the
DSPA criteria to conclude that testing:
D
s
b F (¸) ¡ D
s
b G (¸) ¸ 0; 8¸ · ¸
+; (29)
allows us to conﬁrm that ∆P A
b F b G (¸) · 0. And, since pR (y;¸¹F) = pR (b yF;¸)
and pR (y;¸¹G) = pR (b yG;¸), we can further conclude that ∆P R
FG (¸) · 0.
To prove the necessity of the condition, we only need consider indices whose








(Á¹)s; if y · Á¹;
(¡1)
s¡1 (Á¹+²¡y)
(Á¹)s ; if Á¹ < y · Á¹ + ²;
0; if y ¸ Á¹ + ²;
(30)
where Á < ¸; and then proceed as in proposition 1.
Proof of proposition 3. The results of this proposition are not new,
being already well known in the ﬁnancial economics literature. Whitmore
(1970) introduced the concept of third-order dominance, and Thistle (1993)
generalized the concept to all orders of dominance (his results are similar to
those of DSU). In order to prove proposition 3, we ﬁrst need to integrate
equation (11) by parts:
Z a
0





















































































20Equation (31) respects the relationship in (32). Since we have shown that
equation (32) implies equation (34), we know that this latter is true for all
i 2 f2;:::;s ¡ 1g. By assumption, the function u(s¡1) is continuous and either
diﬀerentiable or piecewise diﬀerentiable. If the function u(s¡1) has n points
at which it is not diﬀerentiable, we denote these points yk, k = 1;2;:::;n.




























We know that D
j
F (0) = D
j
G (0) = 0 for all j and that , since D1
F (a) =
D1
























G (y) ¡ D
s
F (y)]dy:
For s = 2, ∆UFG ¸ 0 if Ds
F (y) ¡ Ds
G (y) ¸ 0; 8y 2 [0;a]. For s ¸ 3,
∆UFG ¸ 0 if Di
F (a) ¡ Di
G (a) ¸ 0; i = 2 to s ¡ 1 and Ds
F (y) ¡ Ds
G (y) ¸ 0;
8y 2 [0;a]. This proves the suﬃciency of condition DSU.
Proof of proposition 4. This is again similar to the normalized stochastic
dominance condition of Formby et. al. (1999) and Zheng et. al. (2000).
Condition DSI only applies, however, to the limited range for ° of [0;®],
and for s > 3 it also includes tests at the limit ® for the conditions at
previous orders12, i = 3;:::;s ¡ 1. In order to prove the DSI condition we
12The conditions in Zheng et. al. (2000) do not require a test at ® for the lower orders
of dominance.
21use an approach similar to that in Atkinson (1970). To do this we use the

































Again, using the isoelasticity of the function u; we conclude that:




Now, we know that ¹ b F = 1 by deﬁnition. We thus see that I b F = IF; and,
similarly, I b G = IG. However, since by deﬁnition, ¹ b F = ¹ b G = 1, it is suﬃcient
to test whether ye; b G ¸ ye; b F in order to establish whether ∆IFG = IG¡IF · 0.
Given that u(y) is an increasing function, this test is equivalent to verifying
that ∆U b F b G ¸ 0; which is, in fact, a welfare comparison for the transformed
functions b F and b G: We now can use the DSU condition to recuperate the DSI
condition. In addition, we notice that, for s = 3; it is no longer necessary
to test for D2
b F (®) ¡ D2
b G (®) ¸ 0; since, from the deﬁnitions of b F and b G, we
have D2
b F (®) ¡ D2
b G (®) = 0. Integration by parts of D2
b F (®) yields:
D
2
b F (®) = ®D
1




b F (®) ¡ D
2
b G (®) = ®D
1
b F (®) ¡ ¹ b F ¡ ®D
1
b G (®) ¡ ¹ b G: (41)
However, by deﬁnition, we have D1
b F (®) = D1
b G (®) and ¹ b F = ¹ b G. We may
thus conclude that D2
b F (®) ¡ D2
b G (®) = 0.
22Proof of lemma 5. If x ¸ a, D1
F (x) = D1
F (a) = 1. Thus, D2













F (y) being constant for y ¸ a, the above expression may be rewritten as:
D
2
F (x) = D
2




F (x) may be written as:
D
3








Using the result of equation (43), the above equation becomes:
D
3















F (x) = D
3










(y ¡ a)dy; (46)
D
3
F (x) = D
3





















Consequently, we thus have:
D
s








Using equation (48), the above expression may be rewritten as:
D
s



























































Equations (43) and (47) respect the relationship in (48). Since we have shown
that equation (48) implies equation (53), we know that this latter equation
is true for all s ¸ 2.
Proof of theorem 6. We begin by using the result from lemma 5 to rewrite
Ds
F (x) ¡ Ds













FG (x) = Ds
F (x) ¡ Ds




FG (a) disappears, because ∆D1
FG (a) = 0 by deﬁnition.
Notice now that
(x¡a)s¡i
(s¡i)! is of order O(xs¡i). Consequently, we know that if
limx!1 ∆D2

















FG (a) = 0 and ∆D3
















Thus, in general, if ∆D
j
FG (a) = 0 for all j < i and ∆Di















for all s ¸ i: (57)
24Theorem 6 follows directly form this result.
Proof of proposition 8. This is obtained by applying corollary 7 to the
DSU condition and testing up to 1 rather than up to a.
Proof of proposition 9. This is obtained by applying corollary 7 to the
DSI condition and testing up to 1 rather than up to a.
Proof of proposition 10. This proposition derives directly from the equiv-
alence between the DSPA condition and the DSU’ condition when the max-
imum poverty line z+ ! 1.
Proof of proposition 11. This proposition follows directly from the equiv-
alence of the DSPR condition and the DSI’ condition when the maximum
relative poverty line ¸
+ ! 1.
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